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Evaluating Morningstar Wide Moat Stocks through the Business Cycle 
Zachary Bishkin; Mentor Joshua Spizman 
Abstract: 
The evaluation of stock selections by portfolio managers is a topic commonly addressed 
by academics in finance. In particular, there is great interest to find portfolio managers that 
consistently outperform the market. In this article, we evaluate the market returns of 
Morningstar’s “StockInvestor” Wide Moat portfolios: The Tortoise and the Hare. The Wide 
Moat portfolio stocks are companies that Morningstar analysts identify as having a sustainable 
advantage estimated to last at least 20 years. Comprised of these Wide Moat Stocks, the Tortoise 
portfolio is comprised of slow and steady growth stocks while the Hare portfolio is comprised of 
stocks with faster, but less steady growth. While portfolio returns are typically compared to the 
overall market index, this basic comparison ignores statistical factors in stocks that have been 
shown to produce above-average returns. This study evaluates Morningstar’s portfolios to 
determine if Morningstar’s portfolio managers select stocks that outperform through the business 
cycle, or if the returns are explained by the Fama-French 3-factor model. In this study, we 
analyze both portfolios from 2007 to 2012. In addition to looking at the entire period 
performance, this study also isolates the recessionary period from 2007 to 2009 to see if the 
Wide Moat portfolios outperform in a recession. Furthermore, in order to investigate what other 
factors may be underlying the identification and selection of wide moat stocks, an analysis is 
conducted to determine how industry competitiveness and concentration is reflected in the stock 
selection of Morningstar’s portfolio managers.  
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Background 
The goal of a successful portfolio manager is to create a portfolio that provides higher 
returns than a market index net of management fees. There are many schools of thought for how 
one should pick stocks, and an even greater number of portfolio managers. Famed economist 
Burton Malkiel (1999) argues that it is best to forgo portfolio managers altogether and instead 
invest in market indices. Malkiel’s (2003) favoring of market index investing comes from his 
random walk hypothesis, which says that, because of market efficiency, stock movement cannot 
be predicted reliably. Because of the random walk hypothesis, it would follow that portfolio 
managers who beat the market are either capitalizing on luck or taking on risky investments 
(Malkiel, 2003). Despite Malkiel’s random walk hypothesis, there are still a few investing 
strategies and portfolio managers whose gains have beaten the market on a regular basis. One 
such investment strategy is that of Morningstar’s wide moat stock portfolios, found in their 
“StockInvestor” publication. While the S&P 500 index has had annual returns that average 6% 
over the past 10 Years, Morningstar’s Wide Moat portfolios, The Tortoise and the Hare, have 
averaged 9.4% annual returns collectively (Cofina). Even when one takes into account the 
management fees that Morningstar assesses their clients of 0.55% to 1.55%, depending on level 
of service, it would appear on the surface that the Tortoise and the Hare might have something to 
offer.   
Found inside the Morningstar StockInvestor publication, the two portfolios, the Tortoise 
and the Hare utilize slightly different strategies within the wide moat framework. While the 
Tortoise portfolio looks mainly at companies that are lower risk and more value focused, the 
Hare takes on positions that have higher growth potentials, but accepts higher risk to achieve 
that. Despite the slight difference in trading strategies, there is only a 0.1% difference between 
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the two portfolios in the annualized returns over the past ten years, and both have outperformed 
the S&P 500 index by 3% annually according to Morningstar (Cofina). Considering the wealth 
of academic research questioning portfolio managers’ ability to consistently pick winning stocks, 
one wonders if Wide Moat Stocks possess special characteristics, or if their returns can be 
explained by other statistical factors that their portfolios possess.  
This question has actually been answered in part by Kenny (2013), finding that the 
portfolios did not generate excess returns for the time period examined; however, they only 
examined whether Morningstar had been able to generate excess returns from May 2006 to April 
2013. They did not break this time period up into smaller time frames to see if they had excess 
returns intermittently. This becomes an interesting question when one considers that the United 
states experienced a recession from December 2007 to June 2009 according to NBER (2010). 
Given that Wide Moat stocks are chosen based on Analysts’ perceptions that they have 
competitive advantages that will sustain their business for at least 20 years, it would seem that 
these companies might fare well during a recession. Hence, one question this paper will seek to 
answer is if the Tortoise or the Hare generates excess returns during the recessionary period from 
December 2007 to June 2009.  
Another way of interpreting the Wide Moat could be to see it as an indicator of a 
company’s ability to compete in its industry. Morningstar might be choosing companies that are 
in competitive industries, but because of their “moat”, have an increased ability to compete in 
those industries. Conversely, they might just be choosing companies in less competitive 
industries, meaning that the barriers to entry for the industry are high and that every company 
already in that industry enjoys some level of competitive advantage. This paper seeks to answer 
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if Morningstar’s portfolio managers are just focusing on highly concentrated industries, or if they 
are selecting companies that are able to perform despite large competition.  
 
 
Literature Review 
Wide Moat Strategy: 
To understand if wide moat stocks possess special characteristics, it is important to 
understand how Morningstar defines wide moat stocks. The selection strategy behind 
Morningstar’s Wide Moat portfolios is two pronged: Filtering then evaluating. First, the stocks 
are filtered from the overall market based off of their possession of an economic moat, which is 
as a firm’s ability to earn consistent positive returns because of a competitive advantage that it 
possesses (Morningstar Investing Glossary). Morningstar lists five categories that satisfy this 
definition: 1)Network Effect: When the company’s quality of service increases in value when 
more people the product; 2) Intangible Assets: Legal assets that prevent competitors such as 
patents etc; 3) Cost Advantage: Firms that can earn a market rate margin while having prices 
below market; 4) Switching Costs: The cost of switching from this firm to another is more 
expensive than the product; 5) Efficient Scale: When a small market can be served by a small 
number of firms (Morningstar Investing Glossary). In addition to being in one of these five 
categories, Morningstar analysts must believe that that this moat will be sustainable for at least 
20 years.  
From these qualifications, Morningstar has identified about 140 stocks that meet these 
standards, adding and subtracting from the list on a regular basis. From this list, the stocks are 
evaluated based off of their degree of economic moat (wide or narrow) as well as how much of a 
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discount they are trading at relative to fair value, which Morningstar analysts have evaluated 
using discounted cash flows. Then Morningstar’s portfolio managers purchase stocks that are 
sufficiently discounted and only sells those positions when a better buying opportunity arises 
(Cofina, “Welcome Letter”).  
Previous Analysis of Wide Moat Returns: 
A literature already exists investigating the returns of Morningstar’s Wide Moat 
portfolios. Kenny (2013) looked at the Tortoise and Hare portfolios using a variety of measures 
to account for risk. They determined that, while the wide moat portfolios generated excess 
returns under the Treynor, Sortino and Sharpe ratios, the portfolios did not show excess returns 
using either the CAPM or the Fama-French factors. Considering that the CAPM and Fama-
French factors are more comprehensive models to apply, it would appear that this investing 
strategy does not merit any special reverence. They were, however, able to create a portfolio that 
generated excess returns when the Tortoise and Hare were put evenly into a combined portfolio 
with 50-50 weighting in each portfolio.  
There are also other factors to consider when looking at the Tortoise and the Hare 
portfolios. Ferreira and Smith (2012) found that the market responds after Morningstar releases 
their Tortoise and Hare trades. This is important to consider because it might explain some of 
their returns if excess returns were found. 
Background of Fama-French Analysis: 
Additionally, it is useful to understand the background of the models used in this paper. 
This paper uses the Fama-French 3-factor model to evaluate stock selections. Although the 
traditional way to evaluate stock performance in the investment world has long been through 
comparison to market indices, there are several more advanced models that academics have 
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introduced to attempt to explain and evaluate the difference between market returns and portfolio 
returns. One of the most regarded models for this type of stock selection evaluation is the Fama-
French 3 Factor Model. This model evaluates stock selections on the basis of  (Beta), Book to 
Market (BE/ME) and Size (ME). Fama and French (1992) detail their evaluation of these three 
factors, finding that there is an explanatory power when these factors are used in conjunction to 
explain average returns. They also find that  has no explanatory effect when it isn’t coupled 
with size. Fama and French (1993, 1996) built on this research to establish their three factor 
model as a regression model. They then tested this model on various ranges of portfolios to 
confirm the validity of their model.  
One important aspect to note is the general trends that have been found with these three 
factors. Fama and French (1995) find that stocks with low book to market(BE/ME) values have 
stronger returns on average. They also find that stocks with smaller market equities(ME) tend to 
provide higher returns than stocks with larger market equities.  
Methods 
Portfolio creation: 
First, the portfolios for Morningstar’s Tortoise and Hare portfolios were created for both 
the time period from January 2006 to December 2012, as well as for a smaller time frame from 
December 2007 to June 2009 to isolate the recession. Thus, 4 portfolio models were created in 
total. Historical portfolio value and holding data was gathered from each Stockinvestor 
publication for the time period examined, as Morningstar does not have the holding data 
available for download. Although the Tortoise and the Hare have been in existence since 2001, 
they only provide access to their historical publications for 2006 to 2012 and then the most 
recent 12 months of publications.  
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For the portfolio value, the total value, including the cash holdings, is recorded for the 
monthly portfolio value. This is necessary in order to be comparable from period to period 
depending on portfolio additions and sales. The tickers for all holdings for each month are also 
recorded. Additionally, the Fama-French industry and SIC code data was pulled for all of these 
positions so that Herfindahl figures could be generated for each of the holdings at the time when 
they were added or sold. Subsequently, monthly return data was calculated at the portfolio level 
so that it could be used in the models used to evaluate the stock selections. 
Fama-French 3-factor model analysis: 
Once the portfolio models were created, the data was uploaded to Portfolio Visualizer, 
which is an online tool that can run a variety of portfolio based regressions, including the Fama-
French multi-factor models (Portfolio Visualizer). This service pulls factor data directly from Dr. 
French’s website and pulls stock data directly from Morningstar’s website.  The actual returns 
for the portfolios were then compared to expected returns based on the factors. Portfolio 
visualizer uses the following formula to regress alpha and also determines loadings for each of 
the factors regarding their explanatory value for the returns.  
The following formula is the Fama-French 3-factor model used by portfolio visualizer 
Rit −Rft =αi +βiM(RMt −Rft)+βisSMBt +βihHMLt +εi 
Rit –Rft Stands for the difference between portfolio returns and market returns.  αi is the 
unexplained difference between expected return and actual. RMt –Rft is the difference between 
the risk free rate of return and the actual rate of return. SMB refers to the size of the company 
and HML refers to the “book to market” value. The various β refer to the factor sensitivities of 
each of the three factors listed.  
It is worthwhile noting that alpha can be interpreted in several ways. It can be seen as the 
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portfolio manager’s stock selection ability or as the level of error in the model, meaning that the 
model doesn’t have the capability to fully explain the returns. For the purposes of this paper, 
alpha is taken as the former rather than the latter. 
This model was applied to all 4 of the portfolios and the results for loadings, significance, 
and alpha were all recorded.  
Industry Competition: 
In order to determine the level of competition in the industry of each portfolio holding, 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index(HHI) measures were derived for each holding both at the date of 
purchase and also the date of sale. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index determines market 
concentration by taking all of the market competitors in a given industry and showing how much 
market share the largest market players hold. The equation for determining the figure is given 
below. “N” is the number of market competitors being examined in an industry, and “s” is  each 
of those competitors’ market shares. The sum is then expressed as a decimal from 0 to 1, 1 being 
the most concentrated and thus least competitive, as it means that one firm holds 100% of market 
share. 
 
Using this model, industry HHI figures were created for each of the portfolio holdings. 
Industry classification was assessed using two different classification systems, 1) the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) system, which classifies companies by a 4 digit code as 
determined by the Federal Government, and 2) the Fama-French (FF) industry classifications, 
which identifies 48 different industries for companies based off of their SIC code. Compared to 
the Fama French Classifications, the SIC system has much smaller and specific industry 
classifications. In this study, 459 different SIC codes were in use during the time periods that are 
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analyzed. 
An average was created for the overall market by determining the HHI figure for every 
company on the market in the CRSP and Compustat databases from 2001 to 2012, which was 
then aggregated to create an annual average for each year calendar year to determine a figure for 
overall market concentration. Two Annual averages were created for each year using the Fama-
French industries for one and the SIC classifications for the other. 
The HHI for the FF industry and SIC industry for each portfolio addition or sale was then 
compared to the average HHI for the corresponding year to determine if the portfolio managers 
were choosing companies in more or less competitive industries than what was available on the 
market for them to choose from in the rest of the market.  
Results 
Fama French 3-Factor Results: 
 Full (1/06-11/12) Recession (11/07-6/09) 
  Tortoise Hare Tortoise Hare 
Average Number of Holdings 24 23 25 23 
Average Monthly Return 0.55% 0.86% -1.28% -1.37% 
Average Monthly Standard Deviation 4.56% 6.21% 6.96% 8.95% 
Average Holding period Length 
(months) 68 46 54 40 
Positions Added 19 34 6 6 
Positions Sold 18 26 7 4 
Beta (using S&P 500) 0.75 0.96 0.87 1.02 
Table 1: Portfolio Statistics: This table shows summary statistics relating to each of the 
portfolios recreated for this research. 
 
After recreating the portfolios so that they could be used in Portfolio Visualizer, we see 
that the two portfolios are not particularly different regarding their holding habits, holding 
approximately the same number of holdings across the time period. It seems consistent that the 
number of holdings would not change drastically during the recessionary period because the 
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Morningstar portfolio managers don’t aim to hold excess cash in the portfolio. Furthermore, they 
tend to only exit one position in order to enter another, thus the number of holdings tend to stay 
relatively constant across time. Looking at the purchase and selling habits of the two portfolios, 
we see that Tortoise has less turnover than the Hare across all time periods. Given that the Hare 
focuses on faster growing companies, it makes sense that the holding period would be shorter. 
Despite that the Hare engaged in more transactions in general during the full period analyzed, the 
Tortoise actually had more transactions during the recession. This is partly attributable to the fact 
that the Tortoise held more positions in the financial services industry before the recession, an 
industry that was particularly impacted by the recession. Furthermore, the way that the portfolio 
managers picked companies changed in April 2008 (Morningstar Stockinvestor, 2008). 
Effectively, they started to rate their fair value estimates based off of the level of uncertainty in 
the valuation. In order to be considered, stocks with more uncertainty had to trade at a greater 
discount in order to be considered for the portfolio. Thus, the Tortoise, which targets more steady 
stocks than the Hare, might have been able to choose from more companies during a 
recessionary time than the Hare due to less uncertainty in their available stock selections. 
Additionally, the Tortoise held Washington Mutual (WM), which ceased operations during the 
recession, so to say that their active decision making in the sale of WM to JP Morgan Chase is 
not necessarily reflective of the portfolio manager’s decisions.  
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Chart 1: Portfolio Growth of $100 Invested (1/6 to 11/12): This chart compares the return data 
for the two Morningstar portfolios against the S&P 500 
 
 
Chart 2: Portfolio Growth of $100 Invested in Recession (12/7 to 5/09): This chart compares 
the return data for the two Morningstar portfolios against the S&P 500 for the recessionary 
period 
 
 Regarding the returns of the two portfolios compared to the S&P 500, we see that, for the 
full time period, the Tortoise and the Hare both came out ahead of the market. Of course, this 
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does not necessarily consider the known risk factors associated with these investments. For the 
recessionary period, both portfolios also have better nominal performance than the S&P. While 
Chart 1 and Chart 2 may seem to portray a positive image of the Tortoise and the Hare, it is 
only reflective of the time periods considered, as different period selections could yield different 
results. It is much more relevant to consider how these portfolios fared when analyzed using the 
Fama-French factors. 
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  Full (1/06-11/12) Recession (11/07-6/09) 
  Hare Tortoise Hare Tortoise 
Rm-RF Loading 0.920 0.710 0.960 0.740 
 P Value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 
SMB Loading 0.290 -0.310 0.410 -0.490 
 P Value 0.190 0.026*** 0.608 0.245 
HML Loading 0.000 0.410 -0.020 0.700 
 P Value 0.998 0.000*** 0.966 0.005*** 
Alpha Loading 0.42% 0.28% 0.62% 0.86% 
 P value 0.340 0.297 0.726 0.351 
Table 2: Significance data from Fama French 3-Factor Analysis: 
***Indicates 95% significance level 
 
 The Fama-French 3-factor analysis showed that none of the periods generated alpha, 
analyzing the full time period or just the recession, thus there are no excess returns from using 
this investment strategy. This is consistent with the results that Kenny (2013) found, despite that 
they used a different time period for their analysis. The factor with the most explanatory value 
for the returns was the market factor (Rm-Rf). Because the portfolios are sufficiently diversified, 
it makes sense that this factor would have the most significant explanatory value. Particularly 
during a recession, many of the established companies that comprise the wide moat portfolios 
will still be impacted by the general broad market movements. We see during the recession that 
the only other factor with explanatory value for the portfolios is HML, but only for the Tortoise. 
Given the strategy of the Tortoise, which is to hold more value stocks, it seems consistent that 
HML would explain the returns. In particular, the strategy for the Tortoise would lend itself to 
companies with higher book to market ratios because there is less growth priced into those 
holdings. It is also of note for the Tortoise that SMB is not explanatory for the recession despite 
that it was explanatory for the full time period. One possible explanation for this is that, because 
the stocks in the Tortoise were all Large Market Cap stocks before the recession, the recession 
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might have caused some of the holdings to drop down in size closer to Mid-Cap. Thus, the 
portfolio might not have moved as consistently with a single size factor as it did previously. 
Industry Competition Analysis: 
Year 
Total 
Market 
FF 
HHI 
Tortoise Portfolio 
Average FF HHI 
Hare Average 
FF HHI  
 Total 
Market SIC 
HHI 
Tortoise Portfolio 
Average SIC HHI 
Hare Portfolio 
Average SIC 
2006 0.059 0.0647 0.0541  0.204 0.2758 0.2424 
2007 0.061 0.0627 0.0572  0.213 0.2725 0.2660 
2008 0.061 0.0646 0.0535  0.214 0.2931 0.3152 
2009 0.062 0.0652 0.0544  0.212 0.3278 0.3003 
2010 0.061 0.0728 0.0584  0.210 0.3419 0.3064 
2011 0.061 0.0693 0.0619  0.215 0.3208 0.2799 
2012 0.061 0.0704 0.0567  0.206 0.3197 0.2833 
Averages 0.061 0.067 0.057  0.211 0.307 0.285 
Table 3: Portfolio Average HHI compared to Market Average HHI, separated by Fama-
French Industry (FF) and SIC Code Classification 
 
 Because there are various ways of classifying the industry of a company, it was deemed 
important to consider more than one way of classifying by industry. The above table shows the 
total market concentration under both the Fama-French Industries (FF) and also using SIC codes. 
We see that SIC codes result in a much higher HHI figure. This is consistent because the fewer 
number of competitors in an industry, the higher the market share for each competitor and thus a 
higher HHI figure. While the Tortoise picks stocks that are in less competitive industries than 
that market average regardless of industry classification system, the Hare does not show the 
same results for each system. Using the Fama-French Classifications, the Hare portfolio is in 
more competitive positions than the market average. However, when using the SIC system, the 
Hare is significantly above the market average, meaning less competitive. An explanation for 
this difference between the Tortoise and the Hare’s competitiveness level across different 
industry classification systems relates to their strategy difference. The Tortoise portfolio picks 
large established companies that would have a massive market share at even the sector level. In 
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contrast, the Hare picks stocks that are growth focused, thus they may be competitive within a 
more narrow market, but are not nearly as dominant when considering a broader competitive 
environment. For instance, consider the St. Joe Co.(JOE), which is a Hare Holding in the real 
Estate Industry. They are the second largest private landowner in Florida, behind a company that 
uses land primarily for timber production, indicating they aren’t a full-on competitor for St. Joe. 
Thus, St. Joe has an ability to dominate their industry. At an industry level, the Fama-French 
Industry for Real Estate has an HHI index of 0.0301, which would be considered a very 
competitive industry. By comparison, the SIC HHI for St. Joe is 0.999, which means they are 
effectively the only competitor in their SIC code (NAICS). In contrast to the small yet 
concentrated industries that the Hare might invest in, the Tortoise portfolio holds companies in 
more broadly concentrated industries like Coca-Cola in the beverage industry. In addition to 
being dominant in its specific SIC with a HHI of .507, Coca-Cola also dominant across the entire 
retail FF beverage industry at an HHI of .165. Because of these differences between the Tortoise 
and the Hare, it is not a surprise that the Tortoise would be less impacted by the choice of 
industry classification system used. 
 Fama French Industries SIC Codes 
 Tortoise Hare Tortoise Hare 
Count of 
Purchases More 
competitive than 
Market 24 30 14 18 
Count of 
Purchases Less 
Competitive than 
Market 11 11 21 23 
Total Holdings 35 41 35 41 
 
Table 4 Comparison of Results Using Fama French Industries vs SIC Codes: This table was 
created by comparing the HHI figure of each portfolio addition with the market HHI average at 
the time of purchase 
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 We can also see at the individual holding level that the choice of industry classification 
system impacts the degree of competitiveness shown in each holding’s industry. As shown in 
Table 4, both portfolios’ holdings returned less competitive index figures when using SIC. Upon 
consideration of the specificity with which SIC codes are assigned compared with how broad 
Fama-French classifications are, it was determined that SIC was the more effective classification 
system for this research. 
 
The Tortoise portfolio addition industries are 
less competitive than the market average 2006-
2012 
The Hare portfolio addition industries are less 
competitive than the market average 2006-
2012 
FF 
Industry 0.422 0.969 
SIC 
Code 
Industry 0.031 0.001 
Table 5 Z-Scores for Wide Moat Portfolios by Industry Classification System: Z scores were 
calculated for whether the portfolio additions were in less competitive industries. The market 
average for the population was calculated using all data from 2006 to 2012 since the portfolio 
additions also occurred across that same period of time 
 
   
Based off of the Z scores calculated for whether portfolio additions are in less 
competitive industries than the average of all companies on the market, we see that both 
portfolios are investing in less competitive industries when evaluated using SIC codes; however, 
it is less clear when evaluating using the FF industries. Because we believe the SIC code 
classification to be more valid, the data shows that Morningstar’s wide moat stock selections are 
typically in concentrated industries, suggesting that a key aspect of the wide moat might be a 
lack of industry competition or an inability for newcomers to enter the industry.  
Conclusion 
 Despite the effort that Morningstar goes to in order to prove the validity of their stock 
selection and investment strategy, this research shows that the Wide Moat strategy does not 
generate excess returns throughout the business cycle and also does not generate any excess 
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returns in a recessionary period. The results are the same for both the Tortoise and the Hare 
Portfolios. Ultimately, attempting to find an ideal trading strategy to fare a recession is a 
relatively fruitless task because if an investor felt certain that a recession was approaching, their 
best investment would be to just short the market. Particularly when one considers the 
management fees that Morningstar assesses to clients who want to have their portfolios mimic 
the Tortoise and the Hare, the investment prospect in this strategy becomes even less appealing. 
If one is concerned with earning the best risk-adjusted returns, they would be better off simply 
investing in an S&P 500 tracking fund than investing in an actively managed fund, even if the 
trading strategy and investment selection sounds like it might be superior.  
 Upon closer analysis of Morningstar’s wide moat strategy, it also became clear that a 
company’s possession of a “wide moat” seems to be correlated with the level of competition in 
its industry. If one wanted to mimic this aspect of the Wide Moat Portfolios, they could just as 
easily invest in an ETF that focuses on large market cap corporations that hold large market 
share because of their size as a corporation.  
 Further research into the Tortoise and Hare portfolios could assess the various measures 
that Morningstar uses to gauge their own investments. These measures include classifying moats 
as “wide” or “narrow” and also expressing uncertainty in their fair value ratings. New portfolios 
could be created based on these measures to see if excess returns are able to be generated if an 
investor only uses certain types of suggestions from Morningstar’s StockInvestor service. Based 
on existing research into the wide moat portfolios, it seems that much of this further research 
would be unsuccessful in finding excess returns; however, it would be an interesting way to 
distill unstated underlying elements in their trading strategy. 
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